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Abstract The recent global climate change agreement in Paris leaves a wide gap between
pledged and requisite emissions reductions in keeping with the commonly accepted 2 °C
target. A recent strand of theoretical and experimental evidence establishes pessimistic
predictions concerning the ability of comprehensive global environmental agreements to
improve upon the business-as-usual trajectory. We introduce an economic experiment focusing
on the dynamics of the negotiation process by observing subjects’ behavior in a Nash
bargaining game. Throughout repeated rounds, heterogeneous players bargain over the
allocation of a fixed amount of profit-generating emissions with significant losses attached
to prolonged failure to reach agreement. We find that the existence of side agreements that
constrain individual demands among a subset of like countries does not ensure success;
however, such side agreements reduce the demands of high-emission parties. Our results
highlight the importance of strong signals among high emitters in reaching agreement to
shoulder a collective emission reduction target.
Recent developments in climate policy have reaffirmed the perceived importance of
minilateral agreements among a small number of countries prior to engaging in large fora
such as the annual Conferences of the Parties (COPs). A growing literature in political science
points to the merits and drawbacks of entering into negotiations among small-n clubs
(Keohane and Victor, 2011; Ostrom, 2010; Victor, 2006). At the two ends of the spectrum,
one finds bilateral negotiations and almost universal groupings like the United Nations
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Framework Convention on Climate Change COPs. Most experts agree that bottom-up and top-
down approaches are not mutually exclusive (Barrett, 2010; Falkner et al., 2010). Indeed, it
appears that some countries have resorted to bilateral deals as a stimulus for action by less
motivated countries in global negotiations, a common reading of the USA-China joint
announcement to reduce emissions that took place ahead of the 21st COP in Paris. The
pledges in the announcement were cemented in the countries’ Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions (INDCs) (INDCs as communicated by parties, n.d.).
Would countries commit to emissions cuts if assured of others’ intentions to invest in
climate change mitigation? This question is of course an empirical one, and its answer hinges
on the success of ongoing international climate negotiations and the ensuing burden-sharing
settlement. However, it will take years before the implications of such agreements can be
(imprecisely) quantified in terms of emissions reductions. In the meantime, one may approach
the issue with other tools, such as theoretical modeling and laboratory experimentation.
Inspired by a bargaining model that aims to capture some of the stylized tradeoffs inherent
in climate change negotiations (Smead et al., 2014), we introduce a novel economic
experiment that focuses on the role of side deals reached by a subset of negotiators in shaping
subsequent global negotiations.
Smead and coauthors (Smead et al., 2014) use an agent-based model with learning
dynamics to examine past failures and future prospects for an international climate agreement.
In the model, agents play an N-player Nash bargaining game (Nash, 1950; Kalai and
Smorodinsky, 1975; Muthoo, 1999), where each player’s strategy set is the interval (0,1)
representing the range of possible reductions: 1 constituting business-as-usual (BAU) and 0
constituting a complete reduction to zero emissions. In addition to imposing learning
dynamics, they modify the Nash bargaining game by introducing an exogenous global
emissions target T in the interval (0,1). Players maintain the full amount demanded from the
global Bemissions pie^—where a higher share translates to a higher payoff—only if the sum of
all individual demands does not exceed the targeted proportion of BAU emissions (and receive
a small fraction δ of their demands otherwise). The authors vary a number of parameters in the
model and find that player heterogeneity increases the likelihood of success and that prior
minilateral agreements can facilitate collective agreement (especially those made among a
large number of small players as opposed to a small number of large players, ceteris paribus).
We explore this issue of negotiating on costly emissions reductions in the labora-
tory. The experimental literature on the avoidance of dangerous climate change has
thus far focused on the provision of threshold public goods (Barrett and Dannenberg,
2012; Barrett and Dannenberg, 2013; Dannenberg et al., 2015; Hasson et al., 2010;
Milinski et al., 2008; Tavoni et al., 2011). The underlying idea is that, in order to stay
within a safe operating space and avoid probabilistic losses, players must invest
sufficient resources into a public account (Lenton et al., 2008; Pacheco et al., 2014;
Santos and Pacheco, 2011; Steffen et al., 2015; Tavoni, 2013; Vasconcelos et al.,
2013). One can view this public good as a minimum collective expenditure in climate
change mitigation that ensures staying below an agreed temperature change, such as
the often-mentioned 2 °C target.
Since climate negotiations entail agreement on emissions reductions with a view toward
remaining within a given threshold, we instead frame the costly mitigation problem as a
modified Nash bargaining game. This approach has thus far been neglected in the experimental
literature on climate change cooperation. In the game, payoffs accrue only if the groups’
demands fall within a given threshold of available emissions. Negotiators must divide the
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burden of reducing the size of the emissions pie by agreeing on sufficiently ambitious
reductions relative to BAU, which in the game is represented by players’ initial endowments.
The underlying assumption is that emissions map one-to-one with wealth. While this
assumption is undoubtedly a strong simplification of complex dynamics, it allows us to isolate
important features of climate change negotiations, such as the tension between a country’s
incentive to keep the largest possible fraction of its emissions and the need to make
concessions if the collective target is to be met. That is, future emissions reductions generally
bear significant opportunity costs in terms of burdens associated with compliance. Since
historical responsibilities are not explicitly modeled, the correlation simply aims to capture
the pervasive notion of economic sacrifice on the part of countries that commit to future
emissions reductions.
In addition to the experimental methodology employed, we depart from (Smead et al.,
2014) in two noteworthy ways. First, in our design, the loss incurred by a group that fails to
reach agreement is independent of individual demands. This feature is consistent with the
standard bargaining game formulation, which prescribes that out-of-equilibrium payoffs are
constant. More importantly, to capture the realistic feature that delay in reaching agreement
over ambitious emissions reductions will result in the need to agree on even more ambitious
targets in the future, we designed the game to comprise multiple rounds with increasingly
stringent targets (see Fig. 1). Hence, while selfish motives still push in the direction of high
demands in the hope that others will lead the effort, there is a critical urgency for the
negotiating group to meet its target.
Strategic implications of costly haggling, i.e., costs associated with delay in reaching
agreement, have been studied extensively. The alternating-offers model entails the partition
of a cake between a proposer and a second mover (Rubinstein, 1982). If the latter rejects the
offer, she becomes the proposer and the process is repeated. This alternation of roles continues
until an agreement is struck, at which point the cake is divided accordingly. The game-theoretic
solution predicts instantaneous agreement on the division of the cake, with the proposer
securing a weakly larger share, depending on the discount factor. The game analyzed
here differs along the following dimensions: number of players (we focus on multilateral
bargaining), timing of the proposals (negotiators move simultaneously), horizon (players
have a finite number of rounds to reach an agreement), and disagreement costs. In the
Negotiations begin
No Agreement
Negotiation time
No Agreement
No Agreement
No Agreement
Fig. 1 Timing and dynamics of the game. The six-player bargaining game begins with a collective Bpie^ of
£100, which is split between two Rich Countries (each endowed with 30% of the pie, i.e., £30) and four Poor
Countries (each endowed with 10% of the pie, i.e., £10). Starting from this initial allocation of wealth/emissions,
the group faces sequential rounds of bargaining on progressively tighter targets. The figure depicts the wealth/
emissions distribution ensuing from each target if Countries were to reduce symmetrically
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alternating-offers model, costs of inaction arise with the first rejection and can be thought
of as (partial) spoiling of the cake: in the limit, if both players perpetually disagree, their
payoffs vanish. Here, the losses are not smooth over time, as is evident from Fig. 1.
Furthermore, players do not bargain on the status quo, as the climate change problem
requires agreement on shrinking the cake from the outset.
Our bargaining game also relates to the ultimatum game, the simplest form of the
alternating-offers model where only the final two stages are considered. Hence the
ultimatum: the responder’s choice is again confined to acceptance or rejection of the
offer, with rejection implying a 0 payoff for both players. Under complete information,
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium involves a rational self-interested proposer offer-
ing nothing (or an arbitrarily small share) and the responder accepting. However,
nontrivial offers have been consistently found in experimental settings due to the
proposers’ concerns for fairness and fear of rejection of offers below an acceptable
threshold (Güth et al., 1982; Forsythe et al., 1994). In common with the above, our
game centers upon issues of burden sharing that are likely to trigger fairness consider-
ations. However, the multilateral and simultaneous nature of the repeated negotiations we
simulate in the lab—coupled with the introduction of a target requiring coordination—
introduces additional considerations, such as group-level efficiency and reputation. We
further explain the implications of the game’s design features and discuss its equilibria as
well as its relation to the experimental literature in parts (a) and (b) of the Supplementary
Information (SI).
1 Methods
In the experiment, groups of six BCountries^ negotiate over a maximum of eight rounds on
increasingly ambitious collective emissions reduction targets. In each round of negotiation,
Countries individually demand to keep a proportion of their endowed (BAU) emissions with
the shared group goal of shrinking the global pie in accordance with the exogenous global
reduction target.
Each treatment consists of up to eight rounds of a Nash bargaining game framed as
a climate change negotiation, where the negotiation terminates if the group meets the
prescribed Global Target T in a given round. The Global Target becomes more
difficult to attain as the game progresses, beginning at T = 60% of global wealth
and reducing by 10% every two rounds (i.e., T = 50% in Rounds 3–4, T = 40% in
Rounds 5–6, and T = 30% in Rounds 7–8). If the group does not meet the target by
the end of Round 8, negotiation terminates and group members each receive δ = 10%
of their initial endowment (regardless of their demands in the final round) as an
unavoidable consequence of Bdangerous^ climate change.
In every round, group members—each acting as a delegate representing one Country
in the negotiation—engage in what we term the Global Negotiation stage. In this stage,
each delegate demands to keep a proportion of her Country’s endowed emissions,
which is perfectly correlated with its wealth in the game. If the group’s aggregate
demand does not exceed the corresponding Global Target in a given round, the target is
met and each subject in the group receives the proportion she demanded in that round.
If the target is not met, there is no payout for the round and negotiations continue to the
next round.
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We implement five variants of the bargaining experiment: Symmetric (SYM), Asymmetric
(ASYM), Poor Side Deals (PSD), Rich Side Deals (RSD), and All Side Deals (ASD).1 All
groups’ aggregate monetary endowments are £100 (approximately US$156). In treatment
SYM, all Countries begin with a symmetric endowment of £16.67. All other treatments are
characterized by asymmetry in the distribution of endowments (and corresponding impact on
global emissions). In these treatments, four Poor Country delegates each receive an endow-
ment of £10 and two Rich Country delegates each receive an endowment of £30 (see Table 1).
All treatment conditions consist of eight rounds of negotiation. Treatments without
Side Deals—SYM and ASYM—feature only single-stage rounds, as depicted in Fig. 1.
In each of these rounds, delegates independently and simultaneously decide on
individual (i.e., Country-level) demands. The software computes the aggregated Bglobal^
demand of the group and displays both global and individual demands in a subsequent
screen in absolute and percentage terms.
In treatments containing Side Deals (PSD, RSD, and ASD), either one or two subsets of
delegates—belonging to the same wealth/emissions category, i.e., Poor, Rich, or Poor and
Rich, respectively—may collectively place binding constraints on own individual demands in
the two upcoming Global Negotiation stages.2 Accordingly, these Side Deals take place prior
to the Global Negotiation stages of Rounds 1, 3, 5, and 7. The outcome of a Side Deal—the
Agreed Maximum Demand—applies only to Countries who took part in the Side Deal, though
it is revealed to all Countries within the group prior to the subsequent Global Negotiation
stages. The Agreed Maximum Demand is the mean of the Maximum Demands, i.e., the
answers of the Side Deal participants to the following question (in the PSD treatment): BWhat
is the maximum percentage of emissions/wealth that you think is appropriate for each Poor
Country to demand in each of the two upcoming global negotiations?^
To be clear, we provide the following hypothetical example of Side Deal implementation in
the PSD treatment. Prior to the Global Negotiation stage of Round 1, all four Poor Countries
will determine an Agreed Maximum Demand, which is a binding constraint on the Poor
Countries’ individual demands in the Global Negotiation stages of Rounds 1 and 2. In this Side
Deal stage, if two Poor Countries choose a Maximum Demand of 80 and two choose a
Maximum Demand of 60, the resulting Agreed Maximum Demand is (2 * 60 + 2 * 80) /
4 = 70. Poor Countries may then only individually demand to keep up to 70% of their own
initial endowment in the Global Negotiation stages of Rounds 1 and 2. If the group collectively
fails to reach the Global Target of 60% of global wealth/emissions by the end of Round 2, Poor
Countries will again enter a Side Deal stage and similarly determine a new Agreed Maximum
Demand that pertains to the Global Negotiation stages of Rounds 3 and 4—when the Global
Target is reduced to 50%—and so on.3
1 A total of 336 subjects participated in 20 experimental sessions. Eleven groups participated in SYM, 14 in
ASYM, 10 in PSD, 10 in RSD, and 11 in ASD.
2 Alternatively, given a sufficiently large sample size, the effect of voluntary or non-binding side deals could be
elicited by allowing experimental subgroups to vote on whether to implement a given upper bound on demand
(e.g., the AMD presented here, or an amount proposed by a group leader); after which, groups who vote in favor
become constrained and those who do not remain unconstrained. We elected to average the Maximum Demands
in order to convey a sense of ownership over the AMD while maintaining sufficient statistical power to detect
meaningful differences in outcomes across treatment groups with and without side deals. See the SI (a) for a
discussion of the tradeoffs between external validity and statistical power.
3 See SI for further details, including Screenshots 4–8 for visual representations of the above material as
displayed in the experimental instructions.
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2 Results
2.1 Global success
Asymmetry and side deals Table 2 provides a descriptive overview of group performance
dynamics across treatments. First, we see that all symmetric groups had reached agreement by
the end of the fourth round of negotiations. When comparing success rates within the first four
rounds, the SYM groups outperform the ASYM (proportion test, p = 0.101, z = 1.64), RSD
(proportion test, p = 0.049, z = 1.96), and ASD (proportion test, p = 0.062, z = 1.86) groups.
This finding is in contrast to the results in (Smead et al., 2014), where the authors find that
asymmetry of endowments increases the likelihood of agreement. A second, more relevant
finding is the limited impact of Side Deals on negotiation outcomes. When comparing ASYM
groups to all groups containing Side Deals (both pairwise and combined), we do not find
conclusive evidence that treatments containing Side Deals improve upon global negotiations
that occur among asymmetric actors in the absence of Side Deals, in terms of both agreement
velocity and (individual- and group-level) demands. Thus, human behavior in a laboratory
setting modeled closely after (Smead et al., 2014) does not appear to corroborate the simula-
tion data of their agent-based model.4
However, we do find evidence that Side Deals among Rich Countries are significantly more
binding in Bsuccessful^ groups—which we define to be those groups who reached agreement
without any efficiency losses (i.e., in Rounds 1 and 2)—than in unsuccessful groups. Consid-
ering groups who participated in either the PSD or ASD treatments, the Agreed Maximum
Demands of the Poor do not significantly differ across successful and unsuccessful groups.
However, if we look at groups in either the RSD or ASD treatments, the Agreed Maximum
Demand of the Rich significantly differs across successful and unsuccessful groups
(Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, 62.3 in successful groups vs. 72.6 in unsuccessful groups,
p = 0.028, z = 2.193). In fact, these differences hold—albeit with reduced statistical power—if
we compare these groups within RSD (WMW, 58.4 vs. 66.6, p = 0.106, z = 1.616) and within
ASD (WMW, 65.5 vs. 78.6, p = .067, z = 1.830) separately. This result indicates that the extent
to which high-emission countries tie their hands is of paramount importance for group success,
though the same does not hold for low-emission countries.
Unconditional cooperation We can also examine the effect of group composition on
negotiation success in terms of proportion of individuals inclined to cooperate unconditionally,
where Bunconditional cooperators^ are those who demand at most a percentage equivalent to
the Global Target (T = 60%) in Round 1. Pooling all treatments together, we find that there is
almost exactly one additional unconditional cooperator on average in successful groups, as
Table 1 Game design
SYM ASYM PSD RSD ASD
Endowments All (×6): £16.67 Poor (×4): £10
Rich (×2): £30
Poor (×4): £10
Rich (×2): £30
Poor (×4): £10
Rich (×2): £30
Poor (×4): £10
Rich (×2): £30
Side Deals None None Poor Rich Poor
Rich
4 For further analysis and robustness checks, see part (f) of SI.
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compared to unsuccessful groups (WMW, 3.89 vs. 2.86, p = 0.003, z = −2.945). This result
remains intact when we exclude SYM from the comparison (WMW, 3.821 vs. 2.647,
p = 0.007, z = −2.703).
We further investigate the importance of Rich versus Poor cooperation and find that
successful groups have almost double the number of Rich unconditional cooperators as
unsuccessful groups, on average (WMW, 1.679 vs. 0.882, p = 0.001, z = −3.426), while
successful groups and unsuccessful groups are not significantly different in terms of the
number of Poor unconditional cooperators (WMW, 2.14 vs. 1.76, p = 0.400, z = −0.842).
Taken together, these results reinforce the notion that strong commitment and unconditional
cooperation by Rich Countries hold paramount influence in determining the success of
multilateral negotiations.
2.2 Individual demands
Wealth redistribution An interesting question pertains to the behavior of the two different
player types in the asymmetric treatments: is there evidence of redistribution from the Rich to
the Poor, in the form of lower demands by the wealthy? In asymmetric groups, we find
evidence of such redistribution: the Poor demand 66.7% of initial wealth and the Rich demand
60.2% in the first round (i.e., across all groups in the sample), on average (WMW, p = 0.000,
z = 3.381). More interesting is the apparent dependence of this disparity on whether Side Deals
take place prior to the first global negotiation stage. Comparing the average initial
demands of Poor and Rich Countries within treatment groups (Fig. 2), we see substantial
differences under PSD (WMW, 67.3 for Poor vs. 57.8 for Rich, p = 0.071, z = 1.805),
RSD (WMW, 66.4 for Poor vs. 58.3 for Rich, p = 0.031, z = 2.154), and ASD (WMW,
66.4 for Poor vs. 60.8 for Rich, p = 0.092, z = 1.686), though this difference is attenuated
in ASYM (WMW, 66.7 for Poor vs. 62.9 for Rich, p = 0.240, z = 1.186). Consistent with
(Tavoni et al., 2011), it thus appears that Side Deals increase the salience of the
inequality, inciting fairness motivations that are manifested through a downward shift
in Rich Countries’ demands.
This increased salience is especially apparent when the Side Deals pertain to only one
subgroup (i.e., either the Poor or the Rich), as evidenced by the Side Deal inputs (i.e.,
Maximum Demands) chosen by Poor and Rich negotiators in the various treatments
containing Side Deals (see Fig. 3). For instance, in PSD, the modal Maximum Demand
input in the Side Deal pertaining to the first two rounds of Global Negotiation is 100%,
and a vast majority of Poor Countries chooses values at or above the Global Target of
Table 2 Success rate by target level
Rounds 1–2 Rounds 1–4 Rounds 1–6 Rounds 1–8
SYM 63.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
ASYM 64.3% 78.6% 85.7% 85.7%
PSD 80.0% 80.0% 90.0% 90.0%
RSD 50.0% 70.0% 90.0% 100.0%
ASD 54.5% 72.7% 90.9% 100.0%
Percentages indicate the proportion of groups in each treatment who had reached agreement by a given threshold
round
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60%. On the contrary, in RSD, not a single player chooses a preferred Maximum
Demand of 100%, and a majority of Rich Countries selects a value in the range of 50–
70%. However, when both Poor and Rich Countries engage in Side Deals, the
distribution of Maximum Demands between the two player types is strikingly similar.
Hence, negotiators’ decisions are clearly shaped by the initial conditions and institutional
frameworks surrounding the bargaining process.
Conditional demands We additionally explore whether other group members’ demands
are an important determinant of individual decisions. Indeed, we find evidence of
Bcarbon leakage^ across country types; that is, we find a significant positive effect of
past cooperation by the Rich (Poor) on Poor (Rich) Countries’ demands (Table 3).
Specifically, Poor Countries increase their average demand in the present round by almost
four percentage points for every additional Rich Country that cooperated (by demanding a
percentage less than or equal to the target) in the previous round. Similarly, Rich Countries
increase their demands by almost three percentage points for each additional Poor Country that
cooperated in the prior round. We do not find evidence that Countries take advantage of the
cooperation of like Countries.
3 Discussion
We explore the impact of country heterogeneity and minilateral agreements on climate
bargaining processes in a controlled laboratory setting. Our findings stress the importance of
early unconditional cooperation by high emitters in efficiently allocating emissions reductions
consistent with a global reduction target. However, the experimental data also suggest that
some degree of carbon leakage may take place, in the sense that ambitious commitments from
50
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Fig. 2 Average initial demands (and standard error bars) by Poor (blue) and Rich (red) negotiators in treatments
with asymmetric endowments
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Fig. 3 Distributions of Maximum Demands by Poor (blue) and Rich (red) players in treatments with a Poor or
Rich Side Deals (PSD or RSD) and b both Poor and Rich Side Deals (ASD). Since only Poor (Rich) Countries
input Maximum Demands in the Poor (Rich) Side Deals treatment, a combines the data from these two
treatments for ease of comparison
Table 3 Conditional demands of Poor and Rich
Poor demand Rich demand
Rich cooperated 3.865** (1.768) 1.694 (2.540)
Poor cooperated −0.020 (1.047) 2.685*** (0.813)
Constant 59.401*** (6.194) 53.175*** (3.578)
Groups 26 26
Subjects 104 52
Obs 356 178
Controls Yes Yes
The dependent variable in this regression indicates the individual demands over the course of negotiation. The
independent variables represent the number of Rich and Poor Country representatives (respectively) who
cooperated in the prior round by demanding less than or equal to the Global Target. Controls include gender,
Annex 1 nationality, stated primary motivation, Global Target, and the difference between the group demand and
the target in the prior round of negotiations. There are 26 groups in heterogeneous treatments that negotiated past
the first period, and these are the groups considered here. Robust errors are clustered at the group level. Standard
errors are reported below estimates in parentheses
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001
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high emitters may reduce the abatement efforts of low emitters. That is, we find evidence that
the two player types tend to take advantage of the other type’s cooperation, demanding to keep
a proportion of emissions closer to their BAU as the other type’s concessions increase.
We do not find that Btying your hands^ ahead of the inclusive negotiations necessarily
promotes cooperation, although Side Deals among various subsets of players do affect
bargaining dynamics. Importantly, under conditions of heterogeneity, the disparity
between the average demands of the two negotiator types widens in the presence of
Side Deals, suggesting an even larger role for high-emission (i.e., industrialized or newly
industrializing) countries.
What are the implications for international climate negotiations going forward? In light of
the vast heterogeneity across countries in terms of both wealth and emissions, the above
findings suggest that the infrastructure around which climate change negotiations revolve are
crucial determinants of process dynamics. Specifically, our results indicate that low-emission
countries will not increase their ambitions in the near term as a result of side agreements by
high-emission states, such as the joint announcement made by China and the USA late in
2014. Therefore, high-emission countries will likely need to commit to still further reductions
to maintain a current trajectory consistent with limiting mean global temperature rise to 2 °C
(Friedlingstein et al., 2014). Furthermore, given the strong initial commitments by high
emitters necessary to ensure success, the tendency to free ride off of unlike countries means
that (generally poor) low-emitting countries—so long as they remain as such—are unlikely to
increase their ambitions over time. A prompt and effective agreement thus hinges on strong,
unconditional commitments by industrialized and newly industrializing countries, a condition
that led to strong contention under the framework of the Kyoto Protocol.
Notwithstanding the recent non-binding global agreement at COP 21 in Paris—which
depends on future negotiations to close the gap between INDC pledges and the requisite
emissions reductions to keep with the 2 °C threshold—the above conclusions cast a shadow on
the prospects for a sufficiently ambitious outcome of ongoing global climate negotiations. Our
results indicate that minilateral agreements are not Bgame changers,^ at least not without
significantly ambitious reduction commitments by high-emission countries, which thus far
have not materialized. To make matters worse, while the game analyzed here brings potentially
disruptive wealth and responsibility heterogeneities to center stage, un-modeled obstacles
further hinder climate change cooperation. For instance, the game equates current emissions
with responsibilities, neglecting historical accountability and future development requirements.
Moreover, only six negotiators must strike an agreement, which simplifies the coordination
problem faced by the 197 parties to the UNFCCC.
Importantly, negotiators outside the lab have to rely mostly on voluntary commitments
lacking legal force, as demonstrated by the shift from legally binding emission targets to
pledge and review mechanisms witnessed in the Paris COP in December 2015. Hence, our
voting system for determining the maximum allowable demands in the global negotiations
may oversimplify the task of Btying one’s hands^ compared to the real negotiations, where
processes leading to minilateral agreements may vary and countries face incentives to renege
on earlier promises if they stand to gain from doing so. However, committed coalitions may
use the threat of diplomatic and economic measures, such as Bnaming and shaming^ and trade
sanctions, in order to induce cooperation by less ambitious states. Indeed, there are examples
of international agreements without binding rules that were successful despite their voluntary
nature and reliance on international scrutiny, such as the Helsinki Declaration on human rights
(Bodansky, 2015).
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On the other hand, climate negotiations can rely on more instruments than those available to
our subjects. Here, there are no direct transfer mechanisms, such as the Adaptation Fund and
climate finance. In addition, climate co-benefits may lure countries to join small-n clubs early
on, providing much needed leadership (Keohane and Victor, 2011; Ostrom, 2010; Victor,
2006). Our game focuses on short-run costs of mitigation, neglecting such opportunities. Yet,
policy tends to be defined by short-term incentives and high discounting, as confirmed by the
insufficient ambition of the INDCs pledged prior to COP 21 (INDCs as communicated by
parties, n.d.; International Energy Agency, 2015). The implementation of these pledges will
likely be further hindered by myopic policymaking (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2016), as
well as politicians’ (and their constituents’) differing stakes and perspectives with regard
to the magnitude of climate damages (Marchiori et al., 2017). Hence, under the current
framework, the global community runs the risk of bargaining toward ineffective
agreements in the coming crucial decades. We therefore urge policymakers to consider
additional complementary or stand-alone mechanisms to increase the likelihood of
avoiding dangerous climate change.
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